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FITNESS HEARINGS IN WAR CRIMES 
CASES: FROM NUREMBERG  
TO THE HAGUE 
Phillip L. Weiner* †
Abstract: This Article examines the Strugar decision and its role in estab-
lishing the standards for a defendant’s ªtness to stand trial before an in-
ternational tribunal. While ªtness to stand trial was an issue in three cases 
at Nuremberg, those cases failed to establish any standards for the interna-
tional criminal justice community. In contrast, the Strugar standards have 
been followed in other Trial Chambers at the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and at The Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes at the United Nations Tribunal at East Timor. Therefore, the au-
thor argues that Strugar may be viewed as the seminal decision on the issue 
of ªtness to stand trial before an international tribunal. 
Introduction 
 In April of 2004, the United Nations International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held the ªrst competency1 
hearing in an international war crimes tribunal since Nuremberg. The 
hearing occurred during the trial of Major-General Pavle Strugar (of 
the former Yugoslavian People’s Army, commonly referred to as the 
JNA), who was charged with serious violations of international humani-
tarian law (war crimes) relating to the shelling of the Old Town of Du-
brovnik in Croatia.2 The Trial Court’s3 decision provides precedent for 
future war crimes cases and tribunals. 
                                                                                                                      
* Trial Attorney, Ofªce of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and 
do not necessarily reºect the views of the Ofªce of the Prosecutor, the ICTY, or the United 
Nations. 
† Exhibits referred to in this article may be obtained from either the Registrar’s Ofªce 
or the Ofªce of the Prosecutor in the ICTY at The Hague. 
1 The term “competency” and the phrase “ªtness to stand trial” will be used inter-
changeably. 
2 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 1–4 ( Jan. 31, 2005). 
3 The phrases “Trial Court” and “Trial Chamber” will be used interchangeably. 
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I. Background 
 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was estab-
lished after World War II by Josip Broz Tito. Tito bridged the SFRY’s 
economic, political, ethnic, and nationalistic problems until his death 
in 1980. After the SFRY tinkered on the verge of disintegration for a 
decade, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence 
from Yugoslavia in 1991.4
 Within Croatia, along the Dalmatian Coast, lies the City of Dubrov-
nik. It contains an ancient, walled city known as the “Old Town.” This 
ancient city has been described as the “jewel of the Adriatic” and had 
served as the most famous tourist attraction in the former Yugoslavia. It 
possesses over ten Catholic churches (including a cathedral and monas-
teries), a mosque, an Orthodox church, and the third oldest synagogue 
in Europe. It also has one of the oldest pharmacies in Europe, small 
museums, and the ªnest remaining walls or ramparts of any medieval 
city. The Old Town was recognized as a “World Heritage Center” by 
United Nations Economic, Scientiªc and Cultural Organization in 1979. 
The Old Town, however, is not a museum but a living city. Seven to eight 
thousand residents lived there and worked in its businesses, restaurants, 
shops, and cafes.5
A. Attacks on the Old Town 
 In the fall of 1991, the JNA maintained a naval blockade of Du-
brovnik as well as a land siege of the area. JNA forces under the com-
mand of General Pavle Strugar began to shell the Old Town of Du-
brovnik in October 1991. The October shelling was limited and the 
resulting damage was minimal. In November, however, General Stru-
gar’s forces intensiªed the shelling of the Old Town. A television news 
team (from the International Television Network of Great Britain) 
ªlmed missiles being ªred into the Old Town’s walls and the boats 
within its harbor. In November, the attacks emanated from the land 
and sea. 
 On the same day as an agreed-upon cease-ªre, December 6, 1991, 
JNA troops launched an early morning attack on the Croatian fortress 
on Mount Srd, which overlooks the Old Town. The assault lasted for 
approximately ten hours, causing death and injury, as well as exten-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, ¶¶ 65–77 (May 
7, 1997) (describing history and disintegration of Yugoslavia). 
5 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 19–21. See generally Strugar Prosecution 
Exhibit P14 (Expert Report of John Allcock). 
2007] Fitness Hearings in War Crimes Cases 187 
sive damage and destruction. The damage was widespread and in-
cluded six buildings that were totally destroyed. In addition, statues, 
fountains, and religious and historic property were damaged. 
 As a result of this military action, General Pavle Strugar was 
charged with the crimes of (1) murder, (2) cruel treatment, (3) attacks 
on civilians, (4) devastation not justiªed by military necessity, (5) unlaw-
ful attacks on civilian objects, and (6) destruction or willful damage 
done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the 
arts and sciences, historic monuments, and works of arts and science.6
II. The Trial 
 On the day prior to trial, the Defense unexpectedly requested a 
postponement and moved for an immediate medical examination al-
leging lack of ªtness of the Accused to stand trial. The Pre-Trial Judge, 
following consideration of a number of factors, denied the motion.7 
The Defense renewed the request the following day before the Trial 
Chamber. The Court refused to continue the matter and proceeded to 
trial.8 The Court, however, allowed the Defense to obtain its own medi-
cal expert to perform the allegedly necessary psychological tests with-
out disrupting the trial.9
A. Defense’s Medical Expert 
 The Defense retained Dr. Dusica Lecic-Tosevski, a neuro-psy-
chiatrist from Belgrade, Serbia to examine the Accused. She examined 
the Accused, reviewed his medical records, and had conversations with 
his family members. She concluded that the Accused suffered from so-
matic and mental illnesses including chronic renal failure, joint prob-
lems at the hip and knee, lower back pain, hearing impairment, and 
ringing in his ears.10 The Accused’s psychological problems included 
depression, vascular dementia, and posttraumatic stress disorder.11
                                                                                                                      
6 See generally Prosecutor v. Strugar and Kovacevic, Case No. IT-01-42, Second Amended 
Indictment (Oct. 17, 2003). 
7 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 191–204, 227–40, 249–54 
(Dec. 15, 2003). 
8 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 259–60 (Dec. 16, 2003). 
9 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 490 (Dec. 19, 2003). 
10 See Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5630–31 (Apr. 29, 2004). See generally 
Strugar Defense Exhibits D83 and D84. 
11 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5630–31 (Apr. 29, 2004). See generally Stru-
gar Defense Exhibits D83 and D84. 
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 Dr. Lecic-Tosevski concluded that these illnesses would reduce his 
mental functions.12 She further testiªed that he had psychological 
problems, which resulted in a reduction in concentration and attention 
span as well as making him passive and apathetic.13 She reported that 
the dementia and post-traumatic stress disorder impaired his memory 
process, which resulted in his forgetting life’s important and traumatic 
events. The Defense expert also concluded that the Accused’s short-
term memory was impaired and that his intellectual abilities had dete-
riorated signiªcantly.14
 Although Dr. Lecic-Tosevski concluded that the Accused under-
stood where he was, what was happening, the nature of the charges, 
and partially understood the consequences of the proceedings against 
him, she found that he could not participate at trial “at a high intel-
lectual level.”15 She further concluded that he understood the roles of 
the personnel involved in the trial (the judge, prosecutor, and de-
fense counsel), but could only plan his defense with great difªculty.16 
The Defense expert’s overall conclusion was that the Accused did not 
meet the requirements of ªtness to stand trial as deªned in the New 
Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry.17
B. Prosecution’s Medical Experts 
 The Prosecution retained three forensic psychiatrists (one of whom 
was Serbian/Croatian speaking) to examine the Accused. As part of 
their examination, the experts reviewed the Accused’s medical records, 
interviewed the guards and nurse at the United Nations Detention Unit, 
viewed videotapes of the Accused interacting with the judges, observed 
him during a court session, and conducted a two-day forensic examina-
tion. They focused their analysis on the Accused’s abilities and under-
standing in relation to the trial process. (In contrast, the Defense’s ex-
                                                                                                                      
12 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5632 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
13 Id. at 5633, 5638. 
14 Id. at 5637–8. See generally Strugar Defense Exhibits D83 and D84. 
15 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5639 (Apr. 29, 2004). See generally Strugar 
Defense Exhibit D84. 
16 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5639 (Apr. 29, 2004). See generally Strugar 
Defense Exhibit D84. 
17 The Expert indicated that the New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry states in part that 
“[t]he defendant should have the capacity to fully comprehend the course of the proceedings 
in the trial, so as to make a proper defence, and to comprehend details of the evidence” 
(emphasis added). See Strugar Defense Exhibit D83, at 14. This is a misquotation of the 
standard/deªnition as provided in the textbook and will be discussed later in this Article. 
See id. 
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pert considered the medical problems already possessed by the Accused 
and their alleged effect.)18
 The Prosecution experts found that the Accused understood the 
nature of the charges against him and the roles of the persons involved 
in the trial, as well as the consequences of a conviction.19 They also 
found him to be quite intelligent.20 They reported that he was able to 
describe the circumstances surrounding the charges against him 
(which occurred over twelve years earlier) and portions of testimony 
from a hearing earlier in the day.21 A review of the trial videotapes indi-
cated that the Accused was engaged in and would act appropriately 
during the trial.22 They observed that the Accused was perfectly able to 
communicate with the Court and answer its questions “with good deco-
rum, with some eloquence even.”23
 The Prosecution experts concluded that the Accused’s physical ill-
nesses did not “impact upon his cognitive abilities.”24 Additionally, they 
did not ªnd him to be “passive”25 or diagnose him as having post-
traumatic stress disorder.26 They concluded that he did not suffer from 
depression as a mental disorder; rather, that he had a depressed mental 
state, which is common to all persons at various times in life27 and espe-
cially common to prisoners.28 Finally, they concluded that the Accused 
possessed a mild form of dementia29 with no serious memory impair-
ment.30
C.  Issues and the History of Fitness Hearings 
 Once the Prosecution and Defense ªled their expert reports, the 
Court had several issues to consider. First, the Trial Chamber had to 
determine whether to hold a hearing, and if so, what type of hearing 
was needed. Further, there was no set of rules or law indicating: (1) the 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5631 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
19 See generally Strugar Prosecution Exhibit P185. 
20 Id.; Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5681 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
21 Exhibit P185; see Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5682–83 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
22 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5683 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
23 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5683 (Apr. 29, 2004). See 
generally Strugar Prosecution Exhibit P185. 
24 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5520 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
25 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5681 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
26 Id. at 5689. 
27 Id. at 5694–95. 
28 Id. at 5684–85. 
29 Id. at 5687, 5699–700. 
30 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Transcript, at 5703 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
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criteria to be considered for ªtness; (2) which party has the burden of 
proof; or (3) the standard or level of proof. Signiªcantly, the last hear-
ings held before an international tribunal on the issue of ªtness oc-
curred almost sixty years earlier in Nuremberg.31
 During the Nuremberg trials, the issue of ªtness to stand trial 
arose in relation to three defendants.32 The matters will be reviewed 
in the order of complexity, beginning with the least difªcult. 
 At a pre-trial hearing on November 15, 1945, the attorney for de-
fendant Julius Streicher requested that a psychiatric examination be 
performed on his client. Since the defendant did not want such an 
examination, he did not ªle a formal motion.33 On the following day, 
the Soviet Prosecutor ªled a motion for a psychiatric examination of 
the defendant Streicher based on the request by Defense counsel and 
their concern over a strange statement made by the accused during a 
recent interrogation.34 The Tribunal ordered an examination of the 
defendant in order to determine the following questions: 
1. Is he sane or insane? 
2. Is he ªt to appear before the Tribunal and present his de-
fense? 
3. If he is insane, was he for that reason incapable of under-
standing the nature and quality of his acts during the period 
of time covered by the Indictment?35
Three physicians examined the defendant, and concluded that he was 
sane and ªt to appear at the Tribunal and present his defense.36 
Based on these ªndings, the Court ruled that the trial against the de-
fendant proceed.37
                                                                                                                      
31 The most recent issue of ªtness of note occurred in the extradition case of The 
Kingdom of Spain v Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. 39 I.L.M. 135 (Bos St. Mag. Ct. 2000). There, the 
court authorized the extradition of the defendant, but the British Secretary of State pursu-
ant to his discretionary powers refused to send Pinochet to Spain on the grounds of his 
poor health. Id. at 140. 
32 See infra notes 35–37, 42–46, 48–55. 
33 Proceedings, Preliminary Hearing, Thursday, 15 November 1945, in 2 Trial of the 
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 22–23 (1947) 
[hereinafter Trial of the Major War Criminals]. 
34 Motion of the Soviet Prosecution for a Psychiatric Examination of Defendant Strei-
cher (Nov. 16, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 152. 
35 Order of the Tribunal Regarding a Psychiatric Examination of Defendant Streicher 
(Nov. 17, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 153. 
36 Report of Examination of Defendant Streicher (Nov. 18, 1945), in 1 Trial of the 
Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 154. 
37 Proceedings, Third Day, Thursday, 22 November 1945, 2 Trial of the Major War 
Criminals, supra note 33, at 156. 
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 The Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was seventy-ªve years 
old at the time of his indictment. Physicians from the United States 
military examined him twice in October of 1945.38 In the initial exami-
nation, a doctor found that he was “not mentally competent to stand 
trial.”39 Two weeks later, another physician concluded that the defen-
dant “[had] lost all capacity for memory, reasoning or understanding 
of statements made to him . . . .”40 The doctors also agreed that trans-
porting the defendant for trial could have endangered his life.41
 On November 4, 1945, Defense counsel ªled a motion for post-
ponement of Krupp’s trial based on his lack of ªtness.42 A team of 
physicians examined the defendant and found that he suffered from 
“an organic cerebral disorder. . . . He remains uniformly apathetic 
and disinterested, intellectually retarded to a very marked degree, 
and shows no evidence of spontaneous activity.”43 Therefore, the team 
of physicians concluded that “he is incapable of understanding court 
procedure, and of understanding or cooperating with interrogation;” 
nor could he be “moved without endangering his life.”44
 At a hearing, three of the Prosecutors opposed the Motion, argu-
ing either that he should be tried in absentia or that the indictment 
should be amended by substituting his son (also a member of the fam-
ily armaments business).45 The Tribunal rejected both requests and 
granted the postponement of the Accused Krupp von Bohlen’s trial 
until he became physically and mentally ªt.46
                                                                                                                      
 
38 Medical Certiªcates Attached to Certiªcate of Service on Defendant Gustav Krupp 
Von Bohlen (Oct. 6, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 
119–22. 
39 Id. at 119. 
40 Id. at 122. 
41 Id. at 119, 122. 
42 Id. at 120; Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen for Postpone-
ment of the Trial as to Him (Nov. 4, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, 
supra note 33, at 124–26. 
43 Report of Medical Commission Appointed to Examine Defendant Gustav Krupp 
Von Bohlen (Nov. 7, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 
127–33. 
44 Id. at 127. 
45 Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gus-
tav Krupp Von Bohlen (Nov. 12, 1945); Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the 
Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen (Nov. 12, 1945); Memorandum 
of the French Prosecution on the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp Von Boh-
len (Nov. 13, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 134–41. 
46 Order of the Tribunal Granting Postponement of Proceedings Against Gustav 
Krupp Von Bohlen (Nov. 15, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 
33, at 143; Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion to Amend the Indictment by Add-
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 The issue of Rudolph Hess’s competency remains controversial. 
In fact, the Assistant of Chief Counsel, Telford Taylor, who observed 
Hess during trial, did not believe that he was ªt to stand trial.47 The 
process began on November 7, 1945 when counsel ªled a motion for 
an evaluation of the Accused’s ªtness to stand trial. Counsel based his 
motion on the grounds that the Accused “has completely lost his 
memory” and could not provide any information in relation to the 
alleged crimes.48
 The Tribunal assigned a panel of ten physicians to determine 
“whether he is able to take his part in the Trial, speciªcally” address-
ing the following questions: 
1. Is the defendant able to plead to the Indictment? 
2. Is the defendant sane or not, and on this last issue the 
Tribunal wishes to be advised whether the defendant is of 
sufªcient intellect to comprehend the course of the pro-
ceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense, to chal-
lenge a witness to whom he might wish to object and to un-
derstand the details of the evidence.49
The doctors ªled three similar reports in which they agreed the defen-
dant was not insane but had suffered a memory loss due to hysteria.50 
They concluded his amnesia “will not entirely interfere with his com-
prehension of the proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability to 
make his defense and to understand details of the past which arise in 
evidence.”51
                                                                                                                      
ing the Name of Alfred Krupp Von Bohlen as a Defendant (Nov. 17, 1945), in 1 Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 146. 
47 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy Of The Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir 
179 (1992). 
48 Motion on Behalf of Defendant Hess for an Examination by a Neutral Expert with 
Reference to his Mental Competence and Capacity to Stand Trial (Nov. 7, 1945), in 1 
Trial of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 155–56. 
49 Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Hess, and Des-
ignating a Commission to Examine Defendant Hess with Reference to his Mental Compe-
tence and Capacity to Stand Trial (Nov. 24, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War Crimi-
nals, supra note 33, at 158. 
50 Report of Commission to Examine Defendant Hess (Nov. 17, 1945) in 1 Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 159–65; Report of Prison Psychologist on 
Mental Competence of Defendant Hess (Aug. 17, 1945), in 1 Trial of the Major War 
Criminals, supra note 33, at 166–67. 
51 Report of Commission to Examine Defendant Hess (Nov. 17, 1945), in 1 Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 160, 163–64. The American physicians fur-
ther concluded that “there is a conscious exaggeration of his loss of memory.” Id. at 164. 
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 The Court held a hearing concerning Hess’s ªtness to stand trial.52 
After hearing arguments from both parties, the Court provided Hess 
the opportunity to address them. Shockingly, Hess announced that he 
had been feigning amnesia for tactical reasons unbeknownst to his 
counsel and was ready to stand trial.53 The hearing was adjourned and 
on the following day, the Court ruled that Hess was ªt to stand trial.54 
Despite this ruling, the question of his competence was raised again 
during trial.55 Hess was ultimately convicted, sentenced, and years later 
committed suicide in prison. 
 As noted in these three matters, the Nuremberg Tribunal de-
scribed some of the criteria for evaluating competency, but did not es-
tablish the burden of proof or evidentiary standards for such determi-
nation.56
III. The Strugar Trial: The Necessity of a Fitness Inquiry 
 The Trial Chamber’s decision in the Strugar case consists of three 
sections.57 The ªrst part concerns whether a court is obligated to 
evaluate the ªtness of an accused when the question is raised, or al-
ternatively, whether ªtness for trial is even a requirement. After con-
ªrming the need to make a determination of ªtness, the Court estab-
                                                                                                                      
52 Proceedings, Ninth Day, Friday, 30 November 1945, Afternoon Session, in 2 Trial 
of the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 478–96. 
53 Id. at 496. 
54 Proceedings, Tenth Day, Saturday, 1 December 1945, Morning Session, in 3 Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 1. 
55 Report of Commission to Examine Defendant Hess (Nov. 17, 1945) in 1 Trial of 
the Major War Criminals, supra note 33, at 159–65; Report of Prison Psychologist on 
Mental Competence of Defendant Hess (Aug. 17, 1946), in 1 Trial of the Major War 
Criminals, supra note 33, at 166–67. See generally J.R. Rees, The Case of Rudolf Hess: A 
Problem in Diagnosis and Forensic Psychiatry (1948) (providing the medical reports 
of the doctors who examined and treated Hess from the time of his capture in 1941 
through the trial). 
56 The issue of ªtness was also raised before the International Military Tribunal For 
The Far East in relation to the accused Shumei Okawa. On the ªrst day of trial, Dr. Okawa 
struck General Tojo several times on the head. He was sent to a hospital for psychiatric 
examination and diagnosed with tertiary syphilis. He was declared unªt for trial. See John 
L. Ginn, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo: An Account of the Trial and Sentencing of Japa-
nese War Criminals in 1948, by a U.S. Participant 25–26 (1992); see also 42 Tokyo Ma-
jor War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East 19637–38 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998) (after reviewing the ªndings of 
medical experts, the Court held that Okawa had not “recovered the intellectual capacity 
and judgment to make him capable of standing trial and of conducting his defense . . . .”). 
57 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to Ter-
minate Proceedings (May 26, 2004). 
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lished the standards for such a determination and then proceeded to 
apply the facts to these newly-created standards. 
 Initially, the Court noted that neither the Statute of the Tribunal 
(Statute) nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, refers to the ªtness 
of an accused to stand trial. The Court, however, reasoned by implica-
tion that ªtness for trial was mandated by the procedural rights pro-
vided by Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute.58 Speciªcally, these Articles 
provide that an accused is entitled to defend himself in person, to ex-
amine witnesses, and to have the free assistance of an interpreter.59 The 
Articles also require that an accused be provided with the assistance of 
counsel60 and that the Trial Chamber conªrm that an accused under-
stands the indictment.61
 The Trial Chamber explained that “[t]he enjoyment of these 
rights would appear to presuppose that an accused has a level of mental 
and physical capacity.”62 For example, the right of counsel may only be 
enjoyed if an accused “has the capacity to be able to instruct counsel 
sufªciently . . . .”63 Similarly, the right to defend oneself and examine 
witnesses presupposes the capacity to testify and understand the evi-
dence as well as the purpose, course, and consequences of the proceed-
ings.64 The Trial Chamber held that an accused must possess these ca-
pacities and be able to exercise them with the assistance of counsel in 
order to present his defense.65 They found that “any question whether 
the accused is ªt to stand trial, i.e. has the necessary capacities, or is 
able with assistance to exercise them, should be determined by the Tri-
bunal.”66
                                                                                                                      
58 Id. ¶¶ 19–49. 
59 See Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 21, ¶¶ (4)(d)–(f) 
(2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf. 
60 Id. art. 21(4)(d). 
61 Id. art. 20(3). 
62 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, ¶ 21 (May 26, 2004). 
63 Id. ¶ 22. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. ¶ 24. The Court further notes at paragraph 23 that “[t]he nature of these rights 
indicates that their effective exercise may be hindered, or even precluded, if an accused’s 
mental and bodily capacities, especially the ability to understand, i.e. to comprehend, is 
affected by mental or somatic disorder.” 
66 Id. ¶ 25. In further support of its holding on ªtness, the Court surveyed decisions 
from various national jurisdictions as well as the European Court of Human Rights. Id. ¶¶ 
29–31 It noted that the principle that an accused be ªt to stand trial enjoyed “general ac-
ceptance.” Id. ¶ 29. 
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 Finally, the Court noted that trials in absentia are prohibited be-
fore the Tribunal and reasoned that requiring an accused to be pre-
sent presupposes that he is able to assist in the presentation of his de-
fense.67 Consequently, the presence of an accused who is incapable of 
understanding or following the proceedings or assisting in his defense 
would render the prohibition against trials in absentia “devoid of any 
substance.”68
A. The Standards 
 After determining that an accused must be ªt for trial, the Trial 
Chamber established the standards for evaluating ªtness. Initially, the 
Court held that a ªnding of incompetence may arise from either men-
tal or physical illnesses.69 It emphasized, however, that “the issue is not 
whether the accused suffers from particular disorders, but rather . . . 
whether he is able to exercise effectively his rights in the proceedings 
against him.”70
 The Court reasoned that it should evaluate certain capacities in 
order to determine whether an accused can exercise his rights pro-
vided under Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute.71 In determining the ªt-
ness of an accused to stand trial, consideration must be given to the 
capacity of the accused “to plead, to understand the nature of the 
charges, to understand the course of the proceedings, to understand 
the details of the evidence, to instruct counsel, to understand the con-
sequences of the proceedings, and to testify.”72
 The Court in Strugar recognized that some difªculties would occur 
in the process of measuring these capacities and setting a threshold for 
ªtness.73 Based on decisions from various national jurisdictions, the 
Trial Chamber adopted a “minimum standard of overall capacity below 
which an accused cannot be tried without unfairness or injustice.”74 
                                                                                                                      
 
67 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, ¶ 32 (May 26, 2004). 
68 See id. 
69 Id. ¶ 35. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. ¶ 36. 
72 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, ¶ 36 (May 26, 2004). The Court also notes in this paragraph that 
the list of capacities is not “exhaustive,” but sufªcient for the matter at hand. 
73 Id. ¶ 37. 
74 Id. The Court explains in this paragraph that “[i]t would be entirely inappropriate, 
and unjustiªed . . . to require that each of these capacities must be present at their notion-
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The Court concluded that the threshold for ªtness to stand trial is satis-
ªed when: 
[A]n accused has those capacities, viewed overall and in a rea-
sonable and commonsense manner, at such a level that it is 
possible for the accused to participate in the proceedings (in 
some cases with assistance) and sufªciently exercise the iden-
tiªed rights, i.e. to make his or her defence.75
 The Trial Chamber placed the burden of proving that an accused 
is not ªt to stand trial upon the Defense.76 It should be noted, however, 
that in its conclusion on General Strugar’s ªtness, the Court indicated 
that “this ªnding does not depend on the onus of proof.”77 The Trial 
Chamber then ruled that the standard for the burden of proof is 
“merely the ‘balance of probabilities.’”78 Following the jurisprudence 
of other nations, the Court rejected the use of the higher standard em-
ployed to establish guilt (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).79
B. The Determination of Fitness 
 The Trial Chamber determined General Strugar’s ªtness by apply-
ing the facts to the standards. In evaluating the evidence provided by 
the experts, the Court reviewed the differing approaches the experts 
utilized. The Defense expert “placed considerable emphasis” on diag-
nosing the various physical and mental illnesses that the Accused suf-
fered and the “possible effects of such disorders.”80 This approach re-
sulted in “an inadequate linkage of the various diagnoses and their 
                                                                                                                      
ally highest level, or at the highest level that a particular accused has ever enjoyed in re-
spect of each capacity.” Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. ¶ 38. The jurisdictions vary as to the placement of the burden of proof in ªtness 
or competency hearings. See Prosecutor v. Nahak, Criminal Case No. 01A/2004/PD.Dil. of 
the Special Crimes Panel of Dili District Court, Findings and Order on Defendant Nahak’s 
Competence to Stand Trial, ¶¶ 61–67 (Mar. 1, 2005). 
77 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, ¶ 52 (May 26, 2004). 
78 Id. ¶ 38. 
79 Id.; see also Nahak, Criminal Case No. 01A/2004, Findings and Order on Defendant 
Nahak’s Competence to Stand Trial, ¶¶ 61–67. “[I]t must be remembered that compe-
tence to stand trial is not an element of the offense with which the Defendant is charged. 
This is signiªcant because every element of an offense must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt . . . .” Id. ¶ 58. 
80 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to Terminate Pro-
ceedings, ¶ 47. 
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possible or potential effects, with the issue of the actual effects experi-
enced by this Accused on his relevant capacities.”81
 The Court further noted that the Defense expert applied incorrect 
standards to her diagnostic ªndings. Speciªcally, the expert was under 
the misapprehension that English common law required that an ac-
cused “fully comprehend” the proceedings.82 This error—setting too 
high of a standard for evaluation—was further compounded when the 
Defense expert continued to measure the other capacities at an exces-
sively high standard.83 The Court rejected these standards. 
 The Prosecution experts “concentrated on evaluating the relevant 
capacities of the Accused” as opposed to focusing on the various ill-
nesses that the Accused suffered.84 For example, once ªnding that the 
Accused suffered from memory impairment, the Prosecution experts 
evaluated the problem and determined that the level of impairment 
was only mild and that his capacity to testify would not be impaired.85
 The Trial Chamber reviewed the evidence and ªndings of all the 
experts, and concluded that the Accused possessed the necessary ca-
pacities for exercising his rights at trial: i.e., the capacities to under-
stand the nature of the charges, to understand the course of the pro-
ceedings and the details of the evidence, to testify, to instruct Defense 
counsel, and to understand the consequences of the proceedings.86 
The Court deemed General Pavle Strugar ªt to stand trial.87
 The Court found that, in contrast to determining the issue of ªt-
ness at the pre-trial stage, determination during trial provided them 
with the beneªt of observing the Accused for a period of almost ªve 
months.88 When the Accused addressed the Trial Chamber, his com-
ments were “collected, relevant, well structured and comprehensive.”89 
When concerned over matters arising at trial, the Accused would raise 
the issue with his counsel or with the court, thus participating in the 
trial. His conduct and actions during trial were appropriate and did not 
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82 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to Ter-
minate Proceedings, ¶ 48 (May 26, 2004) (noting that the expert misquoted the standard 
for evaluating ªtness provided in the New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry). 
83 Id. ¶¶ 48–49. 
84 Id. ¶ 47 (ªnding the approach of the Prosecution experts to be better for evaluating 
ªtness). 
85 Id. ¶ 49. 
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87 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re The Defence Motion to 
Terminate Proceedings, ¶ 50 (May 26, 2004). 
88 Id. ¶ 51. 
89 Id. 
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provide “any reason for the Trial Chamber to hesitate in its acceptance 
of the opinion of the Prosecution experts that the Accused is ªt to 
stand trial.”90
Conclusion 
 The Strugar decision, unlike competency decisions at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, sets standards for determining an accused’s ªtness to stand 
trial. The standards protect both the rights of the accused and the in-
terests of the prosecution. It is noteworthy that on appeal, the Accused 
did not challenge the standards established in the decision, but rather 
alleged error in the application of the facts to those standards.91 Other 
Trial Chambers at the ICTY92 and The Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes at the United Nations Tribunal at East Timor have followed 
Strugar. As such, Strugar may be viewed as the seminal decision on the 
issue of ªtness before international tribunals.93
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91 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Defence Appeal Brief, ¶¶ 246–55 ( July 8, 
2005). 
92 See generally Prosecutor v Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03–69-PT, Decision on 
Stanisic Defence’s Motion on the Fitness of the Accused to Stand Trial with Conªdential 
Annexes (Apr. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Kovacivic, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Public Version of 
the Decision on Accused’s Fitness to Enter a Plea and Stand Trial (Apr. 12, 2006). 
93 Prosecutor v. Nahak, Criminal Case No. 01A/2004/PD.Dil. of the Special Crimes 
Panel of Dili District Court, Findings and Order on Defendant Nahak’s Competence to 
Stand Trial, ¶¶ 57–67 (Mar. 1, 2005) (the Court followed all of the standards from the 
Strugar Decision Re The Defence Motion to Terminate Proceedings except for assigning the bur-
den of proof on the defendant). 
